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TORT LAW-New Mexico Adds the Product-Line

Exception to Successor Company Liability-Garcia v.
Coe Manufacturing Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Garciav. Coe ManufacturingCo.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court was faced
with the difficult legal question of choosing which of two innocent parties should
bear the financial burden of a wrongful death. Ms. Altagracia Garcia (Garcia), a
widow suing individually and representing the estate of her deceased husband,
asked the court to hold the Coe Manufacturing Company (Coe) liable for her
husband's death.2 Garcia wanted Coe held liable even though Washington Iron
Works, Inc. (WIW), an entity separate and distinct from Coe, was the manufacturer
of the product that caused Mr. Garcia's death.3 Garcia's theory was that Coe should
be liable as the successor to WIW. New Mexico law at the time, however, did not
impose liability on successor companies for their predecessors' liabilities, except
under four limited exceptions.4 Mrs. Garcia's claim did not fit within any of the
exceptions. 5
The Garcia court decided to reconsider the existing rule of nonliability because
the New Mexico Supreme Court had never analyzed the rule's implications on tort
claims involving predecessor and successor liability.6 The Garciacourt concluded
that the controversial7 product-line exception should be added to the list of
exceptions! Thus, it added a fifth exception to the general rule of nonliability for
successor companies. This note will: (1) discuss the Garciadecision; (2) explain
the basis for the court's rationale; and (3) explore the implications of the Garcia
decision on companies doing business in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1982, Montana de Fibra (Montana), a fiberboard manufacturing company,
purchased boardline equipment9 from WIW. ° The contract required WIW to assist
in the installation of the equipment. WIW was still in the process of installing and
making the equipment operational when Coe purchased WIW's assets in 1984.
1. 123 N.M. 34, 933 P.2d 243 (1997).
2. See id. at 35, 933 P.2d at 244.
3. See id. at 35-36, 933 P.2d at 244-45.

4. See id. at 36, 933 P.2d at 245. The four exceptions under New Mexico law include: (1) when the
successor company expressly or implicitly contracts to assume the liability; (2) when the successor company
mergers or consolidates with the predecessor company; (3) when the successor company is a virtual continuation
of the predecessor company; and (4)when the successor company uses fraudulent tactics to avoid liability. See id.
at 38, 933 P.2d at 247.
5. See id. at 37-39, 933 P.2d at 246-48.
6. See id. at 38, 933 P.2d at 247.
7. See id. "We note that... [the] product-line exceptions have been rejected by many courts that have
considered them." Id.at 40, 933 P.2d at 249.
8. See id. at 40, 933 P.2d at 249. The product-line exception imposes liability on a successor company
when it produces the same product as its predecessor. Its premise is that liability should be imposed to provide an
injured plaintiff with a remedy, even though it was the predecessor company who manufactured the defective
equipment. See id. at 38, 933 P.2d at 247.
9. Boardline equipment takes pulp material and compresses it into thin sheets.
10. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to the facts are paraphrased from Garcia, 123 N.M.
35-37, 933 P.2d 244-46 (1997).
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These assets included manufacturing plants, equipment, patents, and use of the
WIW trade name. The deal did not require Coe to take on WIW's liabilities.
Instead, WIW indemnified Coe by purchasing insurance for six years from the
acquisition date to cover any suits against manufactured products." Coe informed
WIW's customers that it was purchasing WIW and that Coe would honor their
warranty agreements. Coe's commitment to honor these agreements included
Montana's purchase of WIW equipment. Coe's employees, formerly WIW
employees, were sent to complete the installation of the equipment.
Coe continued to have business dealings with Montana even after its warranty
obligations expired in January 1985. Coe sold Montana some equipment and parts.
One Coe employee, Bird, inspected the boardline during two days in April 1986.
Another employee, Penner, observed the boardline at work. Penner noted that the
start-up mechanism did not have a safety delay and that consequently someone
could start it without being able to see whether another employee was in a
dangerous position. 2
Medite, a fiberboard manufacturing company, purchased Montana and its WIW
equipment. On December 17, 1990, a Medite employee, Curtis Garcia, was cleaning
the elevated conveyor while the equipment was shut-off. Another employee,
unaware of Mr. Garcia's proximity to the conveyor, restarted the boardline. Mr.
Garcia was pulled by the conveyor into a roller and crushed to death.
On December 14, 1993, Mrs. Altagracia Garcia (Garcia), individually and
representing the estate, sued Coe, not WIW,' 3 in negligence and strict liability.
Garcia had a variety of legal theories including: (1) negligent design, manufacture
and installation; (2) negligence in allowing an unreasonably dangerous working
condition; (3) liability under the continuation exception; 4 (4) liability under the
continuing enterprise exception; 5 and (5) liability under the product-line
exception. 6 Coe answered that it was not responsible for WIW's defective
equipment and that it did not have a legal duty to warn Medite of any potential
defects. The trial court granted Coe's summary judgment motion and Garcia
appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The court of appeals recognized that
11. The court later concluded that this was an example of good lawyering but was insufficient because six
years was too short of a term. See id. at 41,933 P.2d at 250.
12. Penner's observation was particularly relevant because "prior to joining WIW he had designed control
systems for boardline plants which incorporated delayed start-up mechanisms." Id. at 37, 933 P.2d at 246.
13. See id. Mrs. Garcia's attorney attempted to locate WIW. Since WlW was a Washington state based
company, the attorney contacted the Washington State Corporation Commission and they informed him that WIW
had liquidated all of its assets. See Telephone Interview with Philip C. Gaddy, attorney at Gaddy & Hall (Oct. 23,
1997) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Oct. 23, 1997 Telephone Interview]. The plaintiff named Medite as
a defendant in its original complaint, but the district court dismissed them as a party. It concluded that Medite
could only be sued under an employer/employee relationship. See Telephone Interview with Philip C. Gaddy,
attorney at Gaddy & Hall (Dec. 2, 1997) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Dec. 2, 1997 Telephone Interview].
14. See Garcia, 123 N.M. at 38, 933 P.2d at 247. "Generally, a continuation of the transferor corporation
occurs where there is: (1) a continuity of directors, officers, and shareholders; (2) continued existence of only one
corporation after the sale of the assets; and (3) inadequate consideration for sale of the assets." Id. The continuation
exception is one of the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. See id.
15. See id "Under this exception, various factors are considered, such as whether the successor utilizes the
same production and supervisory personnel, the same corporate officers and directors, the same managerial
personnel, the same methods of production, and the same name." Id. The continuing enterprise exception is not
one of the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. See id.
16. See id.
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Garcia was asking for a modification of the existing general rule of nonliability and
sent a certification order to the New Mexico Supreme Court. The supreme court
granted certiorari. 7
III. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
A. Introduction
The Garciacourt relied primarily on two cases: Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.8
and Ray v. Alad Corp. 9 Brooks provided the Garciacourt with an analytical device,
a public policy balancing scale, to help it resolve the competing policy arguments
on expanding successor liability. Ray, the seminal case involving the creation of the
product-line exception, provided the substantive analysis which tilted the scale
toward adopting the new exception. Both cases expanded product liability by
embracing the public policy principle that companies can shoulder the burden better
than victims
because companies can ultimately shift the costs of liability to
20
consumers.
B. The Former General Rule of Nonliability in New Mexico Case Law
Pankey v. Hot Springs NationalBank2' incorporated into New Mexico case law
the common law general rule that, with four exceptions, unaffiliated successor
companies are not liable for their predecessors' liabilities.22 The rationale behind
this general rule was that nonliability promotes the alienability of companies. 3 This
means that the assets of a company are more likely to be transferred if the purchaser
does not have to assume the predecessor's liability. The original four exceptions to
nonliability were:
(1) Where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2)
where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporations;
(3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
corporation and (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order
to escape liability for such debts.24
These exceptions stood as the sole exceptions to the general rule for more than
fifty years in New Mexico.

17. See id. at 37, 933 P.2d at 246. The court of appeals can certify issues of first impression to the supreme
court under N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 34-5-14(C)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1997); See also N.M. R. APP. P. 12-606
(establishing procedure for certification to the supreme court by the court of appeals).
18. 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54(1995).
19. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
20. See Brooks, 120 N.M. at 375, 902 P.2d at 57 (citing to general principles established in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (in bank) and Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
21. 46 N.M. 10, 119 P.2d 636 (1941).
22. See id. at 16, 119 P.2d at 640. Pankey involved a judgment creditor attempting to recover his money
against a successor bank after a predecessor bank liquidated its remaining assets. The court held that the general
rule of nonliability applied and that plaintiff's claim did not fit into any of the exceptions. See id. at 13-17, 119
P.2d at 638-41.
23. See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 123 N.M. 34, 39, 933 P.2d 243, 248 (1997).
24. Pankey, 46 N.M. at 16, 119 P.2d at 640; see also supra text accompanying note 4.
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C. CaliforniaCreatesa New Exception Based on Policy Considerations
In Ray v. Alad Corp.,25 the California Supreme Court created a fifth exception to
the general rule of nonliability. The Ray court based its decision on policy
considerations of fair distribution of costs and the protection of innocent plaintiffs.26
In Ray, the plaintiff, Herbert Ray (Ray) alleged that he fell from a defective
ladder. 27 Alad (Alad I) had made the ladder, but had been succeeded by the Alad
Corporation (Alad I) at the time of the accident.28 Ray sued Alad II because Alad
I had dissolved.29 Ray then alleged that Alad II was the mere continuation of Alad
I and thus was liable under the third exception to the general rule of nonliability.3 °
Ray alleged that Alad II had continued to produce the same ladders under the same
trade name without any indication of change of ownership.3 Alad II, however, had
not agreed to assume Alad I's liability.3 2 Alad II asserted that it had not
manufactured the defective ladder and moved for summary judgment.33
The Ray court began its review with an analysis of whether any of the exceptions
were applicable.34 It concluded that: (1) Alad II had not contracted to assume
liability; (2) Alad II had not merged with Alad I; (3) Alad HI was not a continuation
of Alad I because of a change in stock ownership; and (4) that there was no
fraudulent activity. 35 This meant that the current rule of nonliability with its
exceptions could not remedy the plaintiff's claim. 36 The Ray court concluded that
public policy considerations should be factored into defective product cases in order
to achieve more equitable results.37
The court ruled that protecting the plaintiff justified imposing liability on
successor manufacturers because the manufacturers were better able to spread the
economic burden throughout society.38 When Alad II acquired Alad I's assets, it
also acquired the part of Alad I's financial resources that had been available to deal

25. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
26. See id. at 8-9.
27. See id. at 5.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 6.
30. See id. at 7. The third exception applies when the successor company is merely the continuation, with
the same stockholders and executives, of the predecessor company. See supra text accompanying note 14.
31. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 5.
32. See id. at 6.
33. See id. at 5.
34. See id. at 7.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 8.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 8-9.
Justification for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufacturer under the
circumstances here presented rests upon (1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies
against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2) the
successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fairness
of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden
necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will being enjoyed by the successor in
the continued operation of the business.
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with the consequences of defective ladders.39 Alad II now had the same capacity as
its predecessor to estimate the risks and obtain insurance.' Therefore, the Ray court
reversed the lower court's judgment and assigned liability to Alad II for Alad I's
defective products based on strict liability grounds." Alad HI was liable because it
had continued to produce the same product-line and had the same capacity to deal
with defective products as its predecessor.42
D. New Mexico Uses a Policy Balancing Test for Design Defects Liability
The New Mexico Supreme Court used a similar public policy rationale to
conclude in Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.4 3 that a company is subject to strict
liability in a defective design product liability claim." The court overruled Duran
v. GeneralMotors Corp.,45 which held that if a plaintiff alleges that the defective
product enhanced the injury, the plaintiff can only sue in negligence.46 A claim
alleging strict liability was now an option.
In Brooks, the wife of a deceased pilot sued Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech)
alleging that its Musketeer aircraft was defective, causing the plane crash and her
husband's resulting death.47 Mrs. Brooks (Brooks) alleged that the Musketeer lacked
a shoulder harness and this enhanced her husband's injuries.' Beech argued that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that their company had committed any negligence and
moved for summary judgment. 49 The motion was granted and Brooks appealed
directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court.'
The Brooks court addressed the larger issue of whether design defect claims
should be limited to allegations of negligence. 5 It construed a balancing scale
where it considered the policies supporting the limitation52 against the policies
supporting an expansion to a strict liability standard.53 The court found the

39. See id. at 10.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 11.
42. See id. "[A] party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products under the circumstances here presented assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product
line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was acquired." Id.
43. 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (1995).
44. See id. at 383, 902 P.2d at 65.
45. 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984).
46. See Brooks, 120 N.M. at 374, 902 P.2d at 56 (citing Duran, 101 N.M. at 745, 688 P.2d at 782).
47: See id. at 373, 902 P.2d at 55.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id4This direct appeal was based on the court's former jurisdiction over direct appeals on contract
claims. This provision was repealed in a 1995 amendment. See N.M. R. APP. P. 12-102(A)(1) (Compilers
Annotations).
51. See Brooks, 120 N.M. at 374, 902 P.2d at 56.
52. See id. at 374-75, 902 P.2d at 56-57. There were three main reasons to support the limitation: (1) there
was no way to objectively judge defects or mistakes in design so a court should examine whether the manufacturer
made an effort to produce a safe design; (2) a plaintiff who could too easily prove that a product was defectively
designed could wipe out an entire product and thus an entire company; and (3) old planes that were designed to
meet the safety standards of the past should not be judged by safety standards of the present generation. See id.
53. See id. at 375-76, 902 P.2d at 57-58. There were four main reasons to expand to strict liability: (1) the
manufacturer could better distribute the added costs; (2) the plaintiff had difficulty proving negligence; (3) strict
liability created an incentive for suppliers to look for and work with responsible manufacturers; and (4) strict
liability was more fair to the victims because it moved the burden from those who were injured to those who made
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arguments and policies supporting strict liability more convincing' and concluded
that an innocent victim should have relief. The court remanded the case to allow
Mrs. Brooks' claims to be judged under a strict liability standard.5" The Brooks
court further noted that its four reasons for imposing strict liability in this case were
56
consistent with the general policies behind the establishment of strict liability.
E. The Positionof the Majority of Jurisdictions
The majority of jurisdictions that have faced this issue have refused to adopt the
product-line exception.57 In Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 8 the Minnesota Supreme
Court summarized the reasons for rejecting the product-line exception:
(1) the exception is inconsistentwith elementary products liability principles,
and strict liabilityprinciplesin particular, in that it results in an imposition of
liability without a corresponding duty; (2) the exception threatens small
successor businesses with economic annihilation because of the difficulty
involved in obtaining insurance for defects in a predecessor's product; and (3)
of corporation
the exception is essentially a radicalchange in the principles
59
law, and, as such, should be left to legislativeaction.
Many of these jurisdictions have concluded that they must closely adhere to
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement § 402A), 60 which
limits strict liability to the seller. 6 The seller has been interpreted to include the
actual seller or manufacturer of the product and not the successor company. 62 A
company is subject to strict liability only when it has a duty as the actual
manufacturer or seller to provide a safe product to the consumer.63 Therefore, the
imposition of successor liability on a company without such a duty undermines the
concept of strict liability. 64

money off the product. See id.
54. See id. at 377-79, 902 P.2d at 59-61.
55. See id. at 383, 902 P.2d at 65.
56. See id. at 379, 902 P.2d at 61; see also supra text accompanying note 20.
57. See Howard L. Shecter & David W. Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset Acquisitions, in ACQUIRING
OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY at 97-99 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
947, 1996). These states include: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin. See id.
58. 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989).
59. Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
60. The Restatement reads: "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
61. See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fa 1982); Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d
929, 932 (Mass. 1991); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 123 (N.D. 1984).
62. See Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 932.
63. See Downtowner, 347 N.W.2d at 123.
64. See Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 932. "To impose liability on a successor corporation which did not
manufacture, sell, or market the product would be contrary to this principle." Id. (citing Simoneau v. South Bend
Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)).
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Many of these jurisdictions have also chosen to defer to their legislature's
judgment on whether successor liability should be expanded.65 "The question of
whether or not strict liability in tort policy should be substantially altered by also
changing established principles of corporate succession transactions involves broad
public policy issues which are more appropriately left to legislative
determination. 6 6 Legislatures, according to this reasoning, are better equipped to
invite all interested parties to the table, hold hearings, gather opinions and act as
fact-finders.67
Some of these jurisdictions have expressed concern over the impact of successor
liability on small companies." Smaller companies can be at a disadvantage because
they do not have the same options as larger companies. They may be unable to
afford liability insurance.' Their insurance rates are often higher because insurance
companies have difficulty calculating risks and writing policies for smaller
companies.7' Smaller companies are also often unable to raise the prices on their
goods to cover this added cost and still compete with larger companies. 1
IV. RATIONALE
The New Mexico Supreme Court decided to adopt the product-line exception
based on policy concerns. In doing so, it used the Brooks balancing scale and
weighed the arguments supporting and opposing the need for the new product-line
exception. The court examined three arguments, taken largely from Ray, supporting
the new exception: (1) a plaintiff should not be left without a possible remedy; (2)
successor companies can assess the risks just as well as their predecessor and can
shift the cost to consumers; and (3) successor companies gain the loyalty of their
predecessors. Thus, successor companies should also be prepared to assume the
burden of providing safe products to consumers.72 The court considered three
arguments opposing the new exception: (1) the successor company had nothing to
d6 with the defective product and thus should not be held liable; (2) the successor
company did inherit the consumers' loyalty to the predecessor company but this was
not enough to hold the successor liable; and (3) small companies would 73face
economic annihilation because they could not bear the cost of strict liability.
The Garcia court concluded that the arguments supporting the product-line
exception were more convincing because a "successor is positioned to assess the
risks before purchasing the assets, and to then decide whether to assume the
potential burden associated with its acceptance of the predecessor's goodwill by
65. See Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Manh Hung Nguyen
v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 933; Jones
v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982); Downtowner, 347 N.W.2d at 125.
66. Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 484.
67. See Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1111.
68. See Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1144; Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1111.
69. See Debra A. Schiff, Comment, ProductsLiability andSuccessor Corporations:Protectingthe Product
User and the Small ManufacturerThrough IncreasedAvailabilityof ProductsLiabilityInsurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS
L.REV. 1000, 1024 (1980).
70. See id. at 1025.
71. See Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1111.
72. See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 123 N.M. 34, 39, 933 P.2d 243,248 (1997).
73. See id. at 40, 933 P.2d at 249.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

continuing to produce the same product-line."7 4 The court concluded that a
successor was capable of assessing these risks and thus should not be allowed to
take the good (the customers' loyalty inherited from the predecessor) without any
of the bad (the potential liability inherited from the predecessor).75 The Garciacourt
followed the same reasoning used in Ray v. Alad Corp.7 6 As a result, it remanded
the case in order for Mrs. Garcia's claim to be judged under the new exception."
V. ANALYSIS
The Garcia decision is controversial because the product-line exception to the
general rule of nonliability for successor companies has been repeatedly rejected
throughout the country. 7 The court's decision reflects its concern with providing
a remedy for innocent and injured plaintiffs. 79 The court's decision also reflects a
willingness to make what other courts have viewed as a radical change"0 and to act
where other courts have deferred to the legislative branch."1 Therefore, the court
could be seen as overstepping its boundaries and exercising judicial activism.
The Garciacourt's acceptance of the product-line exception means that New
Mexico is now one of five jurisdictions that differs from the majority position. 2
There is an explanation for the difference of opinion over the concept of strict
liability. New Mexico case law does not require a close adherence to Restatement
Section 402A.83 New Mexico courts have rejected the Restatement's requirement
that a company must control the manufacture or sale of a defective product before
it can be subject to strict liability.8 4 This precedent enabled the Garcia court to
impose liability without relying on the Restatement's conception of duty.
The Garciacourt did not explain or try to justify its assertiveness. The court did
not make any reference to the legislative branch in its opinion. There was also little
mention of the possible problems for small companies. Instead, the Garcia court
cursorily summed up its position on all of the concerns expressed by other
jurisdictions. Its answer was simply: "[w]e believe, however, that these concerns

74. Id.
75. See id. at 41, 933 P.2d at 250.
76. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
77. See Garcia,123 N.M. at 41,933 P.2d at 250. In the suit's secondary issue, the court also remanded Mrs.
Garcia's allegation that Coe had a duty to warn Montana and Medite of any product defects. The general rule is:
"[A] duty arises only when there is a nexus between the successor corporation, its predecessor's customers, and
the allegedly defective product." Id. The court acknowledged that Coe and Montana conducted several business
interactions but it was not clear whether Coe had actually had notice that there were defects with the WIW
equipment. See id. at 42, 933 P.2d at 251. The suit, however, was later settled for an undisclosed amount. See Dec.
2, 1997, Telephone Interview, supra note 13.
78. See Shecter & Pollack, supra note 57, at 97-99. Some states, such as Alabama and Ohio, have added
the continuing enterprise exception, which is an expansion of the third traditional exception (when successor
company is merely the continuation of the predecessor company). See id. at 91.
79. See Garcia, 123 N.M. at 38,933 P.2d at 247.
80. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
81. See id.
82. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977); Ramirez v Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981);
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
83. See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 123 N.M.34, 40, 933 P.2d 243, 249 (1997) (citing Stang v Hertz Corp.,
83 N.M. 730,497 P.2d 732 (1972), where the state supreme court turned away from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and held a lessor strictly liable for a defective automobile).
84. See Garcia, 123 N.M.at 40, 933 P.2d at 249.
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may be allayed by application of the principles established in Ray and Brooks, and
we therefore adopt the product-line exception." 85
In a recent speech, Chief Justice Gene E. Franchini, who concurred on the Garcia
decision, tried to diffuse the charge that his court has been exercising judicial
activism.86 Chief Justice Franchini explained that since New Mexico is such a
young state, the appellate courts face many areas of law that have not been decided
by prior courts.87 The Garcia court viewed itself as such: "We have not had the
opportunity to analyze the application of the rule and its exceptions in the context
of a tort claim against a successor corporation."8 8 Chief Justice Franchini
commented in his speech that when a court resolves an area of law for the first time
89
it does not necessarily mean that it is guilty of judicial activism. He explained that
when a court faces such an issue, it looks to how other states have handled the
issue.90 The court then picks what "we think is the best rule for New Mexico
because it is the best reasoned rule." 91 Therefore, the Garcia court looked to
California's Ray decision and concluded that it was the best rule for New Mexico
because it was the best reasoned rule.
Whether the Ray decision was the best reasoned rule available is a debatable
proposition. The Ray decision appeared to handle the question of who should bear
the burden between two innocent parties through a process of elimination. The Ray
court reasoned that since the injured plaintiff could not bear the burden of costly
92
medical treatment, the successor company had to bear these costs. It did not
93
thoroughly examine whether successor companies could handle this burden.
A more thorough examination of whether successor companies could bear this
burden should have done. Yet, the Garcia court assumed that successors were
94
capable of factoring this burden into their business planning decisions and that
95
they could protect themselves against potential claims through insurance coverage.
Indeed, a company can protect itself through purchasing insurance in several

85. Id. 123 at 40, 933 P.2d at 249.
86. See Chief Justice Gene E. Franchini, Address at the Federalist Society's Speakers Series at the
University of New Mexico School of Law (Dec. 3, 1997) (notes on file with author)[hereinafter Franchini Address].
Chief Justice Franchini stated: "My definition of a judicial activist (is) a judge who knowingly departs from legal
precedent in a judicial decision for the purpose of advancing his or her personal, political, philosophical, moral,
or religious beliefs as part of the law in his or her jurisdiction." Id.
87. See id.
88. Garcia, 123 N.M. at 38, 933 P.2d at 247.
89. See Franchini Address, supra note 86.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Cal. 1977).
93. See id.at 10.
94. See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 123 N.M. 34, 40, 933 P.2d 243, 249 (1997). This proposition is debatable
because successor companies require the certainty of knowing their potential liabilities for effective business
planning. See also Janet B. Herman, Note, Assumption of Products Liabilityin CorporationAcquisitions, 55 B.U.
L. REV. 86 (1975). "[Clorporate law and policy ... require settled rules of successor liability in order to facilitate
planning." Id.
95. See Garcia, 123 N.M. at 41, 933 P.2d at 250.
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different forms. A successor company can purchase product liability insurance 96 or
it can self-insure itself by setting aside money for possible judgments. 97 This money
can also come from a product liability premium added onto the cost of its
products.9 8 A successor company can always work with the predecessor company.
The two can negotiate a long-term indemnification and insurance provision in the
purchase contract99 or the predecessor company can agree to put aside money for
the successor company in an escrow account."
The cost of this insurance may discourage companies from purchasing the assets
of predecessor companies. The cost of insurance depends on the type of product
being manufactured. If the cost is prohibitive, a successor company could take the
risk and not buy insurance.'' The cost may also discourage normal underwriters
from writing the policy.' 2 A successor may have to go to a surplus line insurer to
write a high risk policy. 3
On the other hand, the Garciadecision may not have such a significant impact
on New Mexico companies. A successor company may be able to pursue several
strategies that will allow them to avoid falling within the scope of the new productline exception. One such strategy is to distinguish the successor company from its
predecessor. This might be done by modifying the product design"° or by
10 5
presenting the successor company as a different company to the customers.
The Garciadecision, however, did not clearly explain what characteristics will
be crucial to set apart a successor's output from its predecessor. The court only
held: "[w]hen, as here, the successor continues to produce and market the same
product, using the same designs, equipment, and name... [and] when, as here, the
successor corporation succeeds to a position of market prominence because of the
goodwill developed by the predecessor" then liability can be imposed.'0 6 It is
unclear which of these factors, or all of them, are crucial. The Garcia court's
96. See id. There are three main types of product liability insurance: the general liability policy, the
completed operations policy and products liability only policy. See generally Richard C. Ausness, An InsuranceBased CompensationSystem for Product-RelatedInjuries, 58 U. Prrr. L REv. 669 (1997) (explaining the features
of the insurance system and suggesting ideas for improvements).
97. See Michael G. Kadens, Practitioner'sGuide to Treatment of Seller's Products Liabilitiesin Assets
Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 36 (1978).
98. See Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 378, 902 P.2d 54, 60 (1995).
99. See Kadens, supra note 97, at 45. "If such liabilities are imposed by law there is little successors can
do to avoid liability except to negotiate lengthy indemnity periods or make sure their insurance coverage, if any,
is in order." Id. As mentioned earlier, the Garciacourt found that six years was too short of a term. See supra text
accompanying note 10.
100. See Schiff, supra note 69, at 1022.
101. See Telephone Interviews with staff members of Alexander & Alexander, Inc., Insurance Consultants
(Dec. 2, 4, 5, 1997) [hereinafter Alexander Interviews] (notes on file with author); see also Telephone Interviews
with staff members of Gerding, McMahon, Padon & Koller, Inc., Kemper Insurance Agents (Dec. 2, 1997)
[hereinafter Gerding Interviews](notes on file with author). These interviews do not represent the official positions
of these companies. These interviews were only designed to provide the author with background information on
the insurance market.
102. See Alexander Interviews, supra note 101.
103. See id. A surplus line insurer is a national company (out-of-state) that writes high risk policies. These
insurers are regulated under New Mexico state law. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-14-1 to -18 (1995 Repl. Pampl.
1997)
104. See Schiff, supra note 69, at 1020.
105. See id.
106. Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 123 N.M. 34, 41,933 P.2d 243, 250 (1997) (emphasis added).
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statement is more ambiguous than the Ray court's final conclusion that "[a] party
which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
7
products under the circumstanceshere presented assumes strict tort liability."'
The Garcia court did appear to be particularly offended by the notion that a
successor company might market the exact same product and present itself as the
exact same company and then avoid any potential liability.' Therefore, if a
successor looks and acts like the predecessor and benefits from looking like the
predecessor, the successor may invite the imposition of liability. A successor's best
strategy may be to make itself distinct from its predecessor and a lawyer's best
strategy may be to list as many items as possible that make the successor distinct
from the predecessor. A successor company should avoid presenting itself as the
same company to the consuming public in order to avoid falling within the new
9
exception to the general rule of nonliability.'
The successor company may also consider acquiring the predecessor company
through a subsidiary company."° Absent piercing the corporate veil, the parent
company is shielded from the subsidiary's liability.'t Therefore, if a plaintiff wins
a judgment against the subsidiary because of a defective product produced by the
predecessor, the parent company's liability cannot exceed the amount it has
invested in the subsidiary company.'2
The Garcia court's conclusion that successor companies are liable for their
predecessor appears to follow the standard business practices of the insurance
industry. The standard policy for manufacturing companies is an occurrence
policy.11 3 An occurrence policy is one in which the policy holder at the date of the
4
do
occurrence/accident is the one who must deal with the claim." These policies
5
product.
not require the holder of the policy to be the manufacturer of the
The Ray and Garciacourts should have conducted a more thorough examination
of the impact of their decisions on successor companies. The potential for problems
107. Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977) (emphasis added). The Garcia court did not cite to the
Ray court's final conclusion but a lawyer might be able to argue that the language in Garcia ("when, as here") is
equivalent to the language in Ray ("under the circumstances presented here"). See id.; see also Garcia 123 N.M.
at 41, 933 P.2d at 250. If this argument is persuasive, a New Mexico court might opine that all of the listed
characteristics are crucial and therefore a successor could fall outside the scope of the product-line exception if the
facts of its case are distinguishable from just one of Garcia's factual characteristics. This can be a two dimensional
argument, however, with difference in kind and difference in degree, which can lead to even more unanswered
questions: (a) how much of a modification in the product is sufficient? (b) is it a systematic change or a slight
change in degree? (c) will judges be forced to become engineers or marketing experts? These questions are still
unsettled and may have to be resolved through future litigation.
108. See Garcia, 123 N.M. at 41,933 P.2d at 250.
made the mistake of assuming that by only redesigning the logo on its
109. The Alad Corporation (Alad 1])
letterhead and labels it had distinguished itself from its predecessor. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 6. In addition, "the
manufacturer's representatives were not instructed to notify customers of the change." la at 6-7 (emphasis added).
New Mexico businesses should probably do more than redesign their logo and they should instruct their employees
and salespeople to notify the customers of the change in companies.
110. See Schiff, supra note 68, at 1020-1021.
111. See id. at 1021.
112. See id. The Garciacourt did not discuss the subsidiary option. The court also did not discuss "piercing
the corporate veil", a concept recently discussed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Garciav. Coffman, 946
P.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1997). which involved a medical breach of fiduciary duty.
113. See sources cited supra note 101.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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still exists, but Garcia's legacy will likely be its positive impact on injured
plaintiffs. Therefore, the Ray decision and the product-line exception may well be
the best rule, despite its repudiation throughout the country.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Garcia decision may temper a multi-state corporation's enthusiasm for
moving into New Mexico and purchasing the assets of New Mexican businesses.
Although companies may be able to remain outside the scope or co-exist with the
product-line exception, they may choose to avoid dealing with this situation. The
lack of a national uniform standard might create too much havoc for their legal
departments."16
Successor companies will also have to make changes to avoid liability (such as
changing marketing schemes or product design). These changes will cost money.
Even if these costs can be passed to the consumer, they may cause waste and
inefficiency if the changes are made solely to avoid product-line successor liability.
These changes, however, could possibly spur advances in the industry. A
company now has an incentive to spend money on research and development
because it needs to modify the product to distinguish itself from its predecessor.117
This may produce a better product and result in a long term benefit to the industry.
Finally, the lower courts' interpretation of the product-line exception should be
monitored. The Garciacourt did not include any set of factual limiting principles.
This is potentially problematic because product liability suits require fact-dependent
analyses. Some unorthodox and inconsistent decisions could result. Public policy
makers may want to revisit this issue if it becomes unmanageable." 8
VII. CONCLUSION
The Garciacourt has added a fifth exception to the general rule of nonliability
for successor companies in New Mexico. The court relied on public policy
considerations to reach a three part conclusion that: (a) injured plaintiffs should be
protected; (b) successor companies can adequately bear the burden; and (c) this
burden is not onerous because companies have tools available to mitigate the cost.
Therefore, it is a point of symmetry. A successor company that continues to market
and manufacture the same product-line as its predecessor company should prepare
itself to accept the good, the consumer's loyalty, along with the bad, the
predecessor's liability.
ZACHARY SHANDLER

116. See Shecter & Pollack, supra note 57, at 102. Amsted Industries "has litigated the issue of successor
liability ten times, once each under the laws of California, Colorado, Michigan, Illinois, New Jersey, New York,
New Hampshire, Nebraska and twice under the law of Wisconsin. Amsted has won seven times and lost three
times." Id. at 104.
117. See Schiff, supra note 69, at 1020. "[C]ourts, in an attempt to encourage corporations to improve old
designs and produce a safer product, might, as a matter of policy, refuse to apply the Alad doctrine when a
corporation makes design changes." Id.
118. The Colorado State Legislature passed a law that limited liability, much like that discussed in § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to the actual manufacturer. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-402(2) (1997).

